Techblog #6

Audio injection via Laser

Live Hack: Controlling a Smartphone via Laser

In the USENIX Security Symposium 2020 "Laser-Based Audio Injection on Voice-Controllable Systems" was presented: making MEMS-microphones believe that audio input happens via amplitude-modulated light from far away. We reproduced these efforts, to show that such threats are legit and shouldn't be underestimated.

Our Setup

In the LightCommands paper a Google Home was used: these have their microphones oriented directly to the outside, so lighting the right place directly affects the MEMS.

In our setup it wasn't quite as easy - look at this sketch of a conventional smartphone:

Sketch: cross-section of a typical smartphone
Sketch: cross-section of a typical smartphone

The sound waves come in on the right side, get reflected in the sound channel, and move the MEMS membrane. Laser, being much more directional, isn't as flexible; this means that we can't get enough power reflected "around the [sound channel] corner" onto the MEMS microphone.

A "Tool-Time"-esque solution wasn't feasible - we couldn't provide safety goggles for all participants and had to settle with a low-power laser diode (an ADL-65075TL: red, 7mW). As a workaround a separate receiver circuit was set up: an external ADMP-401 (mounted backwards, so that its sound input was wide open to the outside - see below), connected as microphone input to the (3.5mm) headset jack of our target.

The required 1.8-3.3V supply voltage was obtained from the smartphone's USB port via a resistor/LED setup; here's the breadboard.

Receiver
Receiver breadboard. Resistor/LED to step USB 5V down to about 3V3.

The sender was a bit more involved.

A nice little OpAmp (TL081CP) was used to set up the working point (bias current) right in the center of the Laser's current range, to minimize distortions. To calibrate: get "Signal Generator" from F-Droid, set it to half a Hz, and adjust the trimmer pot and the volume until the laser point fluctuates nicely without running into obvious limitations. Or use an oscilloscope, if you have one, of course.

With a typical headphone output amplitude of ±200mV and the 22Ω resistor in the emitter path of the PNP transistor we can achieve a current range of about ±9mA - that's good enough for this small-signal Laser-ED. If we'd need more amplification, the OpAmp would already be available, anyway - or we could just use a smaller resistor, then the current range would be larger as well.

The breadboard receives 5V supply voltage (from a standard USB charger) on the upper left; the two wires on the right (brown and red) are the input, connected to a 3.5mm jack.

Sender
Sender

So far for the electronics.

The Live-Showcase

For the presentation I covered the MEMS with a glas jug, so that ambient sounds (like me talking) wouldn't directly influence the victim smartphone. To show the audience that the optical signals get correctly interpreted as audio commands, I mirrored the smartphone display to an electronic whiteboard (because that worked out of the box), and dictated and sent an SMS.

The actual demo worked, more or less - due to some background noise (alternating hotspots between 70 and 110 Hz, I guess the AC during a hot day) not all speech sounds were recognized equally well. At some time I pondered fetching a Helium-filled balloon from the other room to switch my frequency bands, but then a co-workers' child came to the rescue and had a more intelligible tone range on some words ;)

Conclusion

The attack, as written down in the paper, is for real. Whether a multi-Watt laser can be aimed good enough at the microphone sound hole of some device without melting it (or the surroundings) down is a different question; at least some devices (especially the Smart Home products!) seem to have their microphones located conveniently on the outside, so that controlling them via light may be a valid concern.

Techblog #4

Lines of Code

After the Log4Shell debacle in December (no, I don't want to provide a zillion links) some security aspect comes up in discussions again: Lines of Code, ie. the attack surface of services.

more Lines of Code

Techblog #5

eBPF in OpenShift: finding the namespace

eBPF recently became very popular - for tracing, debugging, and performance measurements. Here I'll show how to use it in an OpenShift environment to find out which container resp. namespace is responsible for some behaviour.

more eBPF in OpenShift: finding the namespace